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Abstract: Fraud risk analysis on data from formal information sources, being a ‘paper reality’, suffers from blindness to
false information. Moreover, the very act of providing false information is a strong indicator for fraud. The
technology presented in this paper provides one step towards the vision of harnessing real-world data from
social media and internet for fraud risk analysis. We introduce a novel iterative search, monitor, and match
approach for finding on-line presences of people. A real-world experiment showed that Twitter accounts can
be effectively found given only limited name and address data. We also present an analysis of the ethical
considerations surrounding the application of such technology for fraud risk analysis.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the Netherlands, the governmental organization
Inspectie Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (ISZW)
(Inspectorate for the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment) is responsible for “detection of fraud,
exploitation and organised crime within the chain of
work and income (labour exploitation, human traf-
ficking and large scale fraud in the area of social se-
curity)”.1 The ISZW is facing both budget cuts and
demand for more fraud detection2. To accommodate
this, they have been changing their work process to a
risk-driven process, which is believed to increase ef-
ficiency. This means that analysts of the ISZW first
classify the people or companies into categories of
low through high risk of fraud. Inspection resources
are then distributed accordingly.
Although in theory a sound approach, results in
practice are not as good as the ISZW believes they can
be. One major cause is that the ISZW uses only for-
mal information sources available within the Ministry
and other ministries. Especially in fraudulent cases,
however, people are inclined to provide false infor-
mation, hence the formal information sources can be
considered to reflect a ‘paper reality’. A risk analysis
performed based on this data, assesses risk in the pa-
per reality, not in the real world. Hence it will miss
1http://www.inspectieszw.nl/english
2http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/
persberichten/2011/03/14/kleinere-en-efficientere-overheid-
bij-szw-uwv-en-svb-bespaart-410-miljoen.html
concealed fraudulent cases.
To overcome problems like these, the ISZW is
looking for other sources for predictive characteris-
tics of people or companies that it can use to discover
fraud. One successful experiment involved water us-
age (Inspectie SZW, 2012). It is known that water
usage at a certain address correlates strongly with the
number of persons living at that address. By coupling
with water usage data obtained from water suppliers,
discrepancies can be detected between the number of
people registered to be living at an address and the
predicted number of people based on the water us-
age. The discrepancy is an indicator for, for exam-
ple, someone falsifying his/her address to meet the
requirements for receiving welfare support.
Unfortunately, water usage can only be used to
predict certain types of fraud, like welfare or unem-
ployment benefits, which involve household charac-
teristics. Other types of fraud, like undeclared capi-
tal or income cannot be related to falsified addresses.
Nevertheless, the experiment showed that involving
‘data from the real world’ allows for indicators for fal-
sification and attempts at concealment, and that such
indicators are strong predictors for high risk of fraud.
One direction the ISZW is exploring, is the use
of social media. People voluntarily share a lot of
information about themselves online. Furthermore,
research has shown that, contrary to popular belief,
online profiles do not depict who we want to be, but
who we are (Back et al., 2010). For example, some-
one who Twitters about bikes he repairs, buys or sells
might have undeclared income. Or someone who is
posting Facebook updates from all over Europe, is
apparently in possession of sufficient funds for trav-
eling, hence likely of undeclared capital or income.
Note that possibly incriminating information is
not only disclosed because of carelessness, but also
because many on-line activities unavoidably leave
traces. For example, if someone raises a substan-
tial income by buying and selling items on an on-
line auction website, the website unavoidably con-
tains all data necessary to calculate this income, hence
for checking whether or not that income has been de-
clared and whether or not that income violates a re-
quirement for receiving welfare support.
If data from social media and other websites could
be harnessed, many real-world fraud predictors might
be derived. However, before the ISZW is able to
harness information from social media, they need to
be able to identify which online presences belong
to a certain person. With online presence we mean
any account on some social media or other website,
such as Twitter, Facebook, eBay or some blog. The
ISZW does not have much information in its informa-
tion sources usable for this identification: typically
only name, address, phone number(s), and possibly
an email address.
This paper focusses on this particular problem:
Given only limited details about a person, can one au-
tomatically determine his/her online presences with
sufficient certainty? In essence an entity resolution
problem (Brizan and Tansel, 2006) on internet-scale.
In our experiments, we use a Twitter account as a rep-
resentative examples of an online presence. There are
two important characteristics of working with inter-
net data that make such a task difficult: First, the vast
amount of Twitter accounts (around 900 million at the
time of the experiment) makes a side-by-side com-
parison of details of a person and a Twitter account
infeasible. Secondly, the influence of noise, i.e., nick-
names, duplicates, false and incomplete accounts, in-
flicts a significant performance penalty.
Contributions This paper presents (a) a novel iter-
ative search, monitor, and match approach for finding
on-line presences of people given only limited name,
address data; (b) a real-world experiment with two
subject groups of 22 (voluntary sign-up) and 85 sub-
jects (from ISZW), respectively, where our IMatcher
prototype gathered candidate accounts for extended
periods of time. Although our initial attempt at pin-
pointing the correct account for each subject proved
ineffective, we showed that in almost all cases, the
correct account was among the candidates. And (c) an
analysis of the ethical considerations surrounding the
application of such technology for fraud risk analy-
sis. In this way, the paper provides one step towards
the vision of harnessing real-world data from social
media and internet for fraud risk analysis.
Outlook The rest of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 de-
scribes the approach on a conceptual level. Section 4
presents some technical aspects of realizing the ap-
proach in practice. Section 5 describes the performed
experiments, which are discussed in Section 6. Sec-
tion 7 discusses some of the ethical concerns sur-
rounding both the experiments and the application of
this approach for fraud detection. Finally Section 8
concludes the paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
The task of finding a person’s Twitter account can
be seen as an entity resolution problem (Brizan and
Tansel, 2006). Many approaches from this field can-
not be applied, however, because one of the sources
is not directly accessible: the database behind twit-
ter.com. The task can also be described as an entity
extraction and disambiguation problem. Often, ap-
proaches in this field use a knowledge base, such as
Aida (Yosef et al., 2011) which uses Yago (Suchanek
et al., 2007). These are also not applicable here, be-
cause the sought entities are not famous, hence do not
appear in any knowledge base. An open world ap-
proach such as (Habib and van Keulen, 2013) comes
closer, but as opposed to this work, in the end we are
not interested in any homepage for the entity, but in
a specific one: the person’s Twitter account. Another
difference of this work with many others, is that our
approach is incremental: new candidates and/or at-
tributes are discovered and evaluated continuously.
Linking social media profiles is a related problem.
Veldman (Veldman, 2009) investigated the value of
the connection network for linking the Dutch social
network site Hyves with LinkedIn. Narayanan and
Shmatikov (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2009) used
a known, labeled network surrounding a user to de-
anonymize an anonymous network surrounding the
same user. Both confirm that the network alone is
not discriminative enough, but including the network
in an attribute-based matching improves performance.
Nemo (Jain and Kumaraguru, 2012) uses three di-
mensions: profile details, user generated content, and
connection network. Starting with a social media pro-
file provides more information for search than in our
application. Therefore, one clue they found most ef-
fective cannot be exploited: self-mentioning, where
someone tweets a reference to his/her Facebook page.
Other approaches towards using online profiles
to gather data about individuals have surfaced. An
example is RIOT3. This system finds people on-
line, tracks their past activities and makes predictions
about future movements. RIOT is semi-automatic in
its disambiguation.
Other forms of input have been investigated. (Per-
ito et al., 2011) use usernames from Google and EBay
services to find accounts belonging to the same user.
Face recognition can also be used as input (Minder
and Bernstein, 2011). Although in itself it does not
perform better than text-based approaches, they do
show that combining both dimensions increases ac-
curacy.
Note that many approaches mentioned here work
with pre-fetched databases, not directly on internet-
scale data as we did.
3 CONCEPTUAL APPROACH
When looking for something, humans often take
a longlist/shortlist approach: using a set of heuristic
queries they quickly gather a set of possible answers
to their search: the longlist. Each possible answer un-
dergoes a brief examination to select the few answers
that (s)he deems most likely to be correct: the short-
list. The answers on the shortlist undergo a more thor-
ough examination for determining the final answer.
To automatically find online presences of a per-
son, we take a similar, but automated approach. First,
a set of possibly matching online presences are gath-
ered. Together they form the longlist. The challenge
is to ensure that the longlist includes the correct ones
while at the same time keeping the length of the list
within practical bounds. Every entry of the longlist
is examined to gather some characteristics about it.
Comparing these characteristics with the subject of
the initial search yields a similarity score. Select-
ing only the entries with the highest similarity scores
yields the shortlist, a list of likely correct results.
We deviate from the human longlist/shortlist ap-
proach in two ways:
• Besides a shortlist of likely correct results, also a
list of highly likely incorrect results is determined
(the exclusion list).
• The process is iterative: the longlist, shortlist and
exclusion list are updated and improved at each
iteration with the aim that the shortlist converges
to the correct result.
3http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/10/
software-tracks-social-media-defence
3.1 Formalization of approach
We assume that a set of persons P is given. For each
person p ∈ P, data on a number of attributes a ∈ A is
also given, denoted as p.a. In our experiments, A =
{firstname, lastname,address,email, telephone}.
Let T be the set of all Twitter accounts. The goal
of our approach is to identify for all p∈ P, the Twitter
account of this person, denoted as t˜p.
Note that it is infeasible to iterate over all accounts
t ∈ T as there were around 900 million at the time
of the experiment. Therefore, we follow a three-step
strategy. Executing the three steps once is called an it-
eration denoted with I. A set of consecutive iterations
is call a run denoted with r = {I1, . . . , IN}. Each sub-
sequent iteration In produces, for each p ∈ P, an im-
proved candidate set or longlist Cnp of accounts possi-
bly belonging to p and an exclusion set Enp of accounts
that have been considered but found to be not belong-
ing to p with sufficient certainty.
Step 1 The aim of the first step is to construct a
longlist of candidates while ensuring that it includes
the correct one if there is one. The first step starts with
a search for possibly matching Twitter accounts using
a number of queries Q. Each query q ∈ Q results in a
set of Twitter accounts q(p) = T ′.
Queries we used in our experiments were, for ex-
ample, Google queries like ‘p.firstname p.lastname
twitter’ from which we extracted Twitter accounts
from the top-8 (later top-20) results, or spatial queries
on Twitter producing all tweets sent within a 200 me-
ter radius around the coordinates of p.address from
which we extracted the accounts of the users who sent
them.
The union of all query results is the candidate set
of that iteration: cnp =
S
q∈Q q(p). The found candi-
dates are accumulated. Let Cnp = (C
n−1
p ∪ cnp)\En−1p
be the set of candidates after iteration In. Obviously,
the start situation isC0p = /0 and E0p = /0.
The set of queries are constructed in such a way
that they achieve a high likelihood that the correct re-
sult is in the candidate set, i.e., 0 P(t˜p ∈ cnp) ≤ 1
even though the queries can only produce a very lim-
ited result set |q(p)| |T |. Sections 4 and 5.1 provide
more details on the exact construction of the queries.
Step 2 The goal of the second step is to gather more
details about the candidates on the longlist, includ-
ing by assumption, about the person who owns the
account. Then, for each candidate of a person, we de-
termine how similar it is to the data we have on that
person.
We use a set of similarity functions S. Each
s ∈ S determines a similarity score s(p, t) ∈ [0,1]
based on certain criteria. The overall similarity for
all p ∈ P and for all t ∈Cnp is computed as os(p, t) =
1
W ∑s∈Swss(p, t) where ws is the weight of similarity
function s andW = ∑s∈Sws.
Step 3 Along with (hopefully) the correct result t˜p,
there are obviously many incorrect results inCnp called
false positives Fnp =C
n
p\{t˜p}.
The goal of the third step, is to mark those ac-
counts as false positives for which sufficient certainty
has been obtained that they do not belong to p, i.e.,
which accounts to add to the exclusion set. Three
thresholds are in play here:
• Let β be the number of iterations during which no
accounts are excluded.
• Let α1 be the similarity score below which ac-
counts are excluded.
• Let α2 be the similarity score above which ac-
counts are considered plausible.
Therefore, Enp =
{
/0 if n≤ β
{t ∈Cnp|os(p, t)≤ α1} otherwise
From the remaining candidates, we determine a
set ofmost plausible candidates or shortlist C˜np = {t ∈
Cnp|os(p, t)≥ α2}
Convergence The expectation is that with a grow-
ing number of iterations, the steps converge to the fol-
lowing two desirable situations: C˜np = {t˜p} in case
p has a Twitter account in reality, or C˜np = /0 in case
(s)he hasn’t. There are two important reasons that
strengthen this expectation.
• Query results may sometimes include t˜p, but also
many times not. Repeating the queries over time,
increases the likelihood that t˜p is encountered
eventually. Just once does a person need to write
a tweet sufficiently close to the known address
or sufficiently popular to appear in the top-20
Google result, for the system to pick it up.
• By accumulating the data gathered in step 2, the
similarity functions have more data to go one,
hence can be expected to gain in accuracy.
For these two reasons, it is expected that the correct
Twitter account will ‘surface’ eventually.
Note that for our application, it is not abso-
lutely necessary that the desirable situation is actually
achieved. A shortlist with several possible candidates
is usable as input to the risk analysis process. The lat-
ter is statistical in nature, hence it is straightforward to
deal with more than one candidate as long as each has
an adequate probability estimate (van Keulen, 2012).
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Figure 1: Overview of the IMatcher system
4 TECHNICAL ASPECTS
Overview architecture The system implementing
the conceptual approach of Section 3 is called
IMatcher. Figure 1 presents the architectural
overview. The core of IMatcher is an XML database
storing all data: input data on the persons to be found
as well as data on the candidate Twitter accounts in-
cluding user profile data, photo, collected tweets, and
any email addresses and phone numbers found in the
tweets.
The two other main components are the crawler
and the matcher. The crawler is responsible for all
Internet access: executing the queries, retrieving re-
sulting web pages, and extracting attributes and ac-
counts from those pages, as well as Twitter access: for
all found accounts, retrieving profile data, collect all
tweets, and extract information from the tweet texts.
The matcher is responsible for a multi-criteria com-
parison between the input person data with the data
collected on the found accounts. Both components
use a pipeline architecture (also known as pipe-and-
filter) (Hofmann et al., 1996) for easy scheduling and
monitoring.
Crawler pipelines The pipelines for the crawler are
presented in Figure 2.
The inflow of the first pipeline are the persons.
The first few sinks execute the queries in an attempt
to find Twitter accounts. Thus found accounts pro-
vide the inflow for the second pipeline. To complete
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Figure 2: The IMatcher crawler pipelines
the inflow, the ‘KnownTwitterEnumerator’ also sends
the candidate accounts from previous iterations. Any
newly found accounts are stores with the person by
the ‘PersonUpdater’.
The second pipeline is responsible for extracting
information about the accounts. Profile information
and a photo are extracted at each iteration to ensure
that changes are caught. The pipeline also contains
a ‘TwitterAccountPruner’ (not shown) that filters ac-
counts in the exclusion list thereby avoiding that they
get processed. Furthermore, from the moment an ac-
count becomes a candidate for some person, its tweets
are collected.
Those tweets are the inflow for the third pipeline
responsible for extracting information from the
tweets, such as the language, email addresses, phone
numbers, etc. This information is added to the stored
account data as it provides valuable clues for match-
ing.
Note that although only Twitter-related sinks are
shown, the architecture is extensible with more sinks
and pipelines exploring other data sources, such as
Facebook or e-bay.
Matcher pipeline The matcher pipeline is rather
straightforward. Its inflow consists of all combina-
tions of a person and one of its candidate accounts.
Each sink computes a different similarity score based
on some specific criterion. A final sink aggregates the
individual scores to one overall score. All scores are
stored.
Input data The IMatcher requires that for each per-
son an unique number, e.g., the social security num-
ber is provided. This number is not used in searching
or matching and only serves to uniquely identify the
person. Furthermore, the following can be optionally
provided for better search and matching:
• Firstname(s)
• Lastname
• ‘Tussenvoegsel’ (if any)4
• Any addresses known for the person, such as
home and work address. If unknown or not known
precisely, the information can be provided on
street, city, or country level.
• Any phone numbers known for the person.
• Any email addresses known for the person.
• Any aliases known for the person, such as nick-
names, often used online pseudonyms or avatar
names in online games.
Request limits and proxies Many on-line services
impose strict limits on the usage of their APIs.
IMatcher uses Google search and the Twitter API.
Twitter limits the number of requests per hour.
Google search not only has a limit on the number of
requests, but also requires that requests are not sent in
quick succession in an attempt to only allow search
4A ‘tussenvoegsels’ is a typical Dutch phenomenon. It
is a prefix in the lastname. For example, in “Jan van der
Sloot”, “Jan” is the first name, “van der Sloot” the lastname
and “van der” the ‘tussenvoegsel’. The name would be al-
phabetically ordered under ‘S’ of “Sloot”. In other coun-
tries, the ‘tussenvoegsels’ are often contracted, e.g., “Jan
vanderSloot”.
by humans.
In the envisioned production setting, IMatcher is
expected to run within the Dutch iRN infrastructure5
already available for the Dutch national police to re-
search and investigation of the internet in a safe and
forensically secure way. Since iRN already provides
mechanisms for dealing with request limits, we did
chose to use a simple intermediary solution based on
proxies for carrying out the experiments. A proxy is
a service that forwards requests, hence mimicking a
different origin of the request with its own limit. In
the implementation, we re-used code from the “Neo-
geo” project6, which is a research prototype from the
University of Twente that allows for (almost) auto-
matic crawling. Its automated crawling and infor-
mation extraction functionality is not used; only its
lower-level functionality for handling proxies and re-
questing, parsing and storing web pages.
For more details on IMatcher, we refer to (Been,
2013).
5 EXPERIMENTS
We identify four goals in our experiments inves-
tigating how certain factors would influence the re-
sulting longlist. After these experiments, the gathered
data was analyzed to see how well it could be used
to pinpoint the correct account or at least identify a
shortlist of most likely matches.
The first goal is to establish a relation between the
number of iterations n and the average setsize Ln =
1
|P| ∑p∈P |Cnp|. This investigates the feasibility of the
chosen approach. The average setsize was expected
to increase with each iteration, but also that it would
stabilize and, over time, even reduce with a growing
exclusion list Enp.
The second goal is to investigate the influence of
the input attributes A on the inclusion of correct ac-
counts In =
∣∣{t ∈Cnp | ∃p ∈ P : t = t˜p}∣∣. It was ex-
pected that not using all the input attributes available,
but leaving out, for example, the lastname, would
negatively influence inclusion. Reversing this result
would show how inclusion would benefit from adding
a specific input parameter.
The third goal is to investigate the relation be-
tween the number of iterations n and inclusion In. It
was expected that inclusion, i.e., the number of dis-
covered correct accounts, would rise during the first
few iterations, and then stabilize at some number with
only an incidental increment.
5http://columbo.nl
6https://github.com/utwente-db/neogeo
Finally, the fourth goal is to study the influence
of broader search criteria on the setsize Ln. Broader
search queries produce longer longlists, but are also
expected to influence inclusion favorably.
5.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Subject selection Two different datasets were avail-
able for experimentation. The first dataset, called
‘sign-up’, consisted of 22 subjects, 16 male and 6 fe-
male. All subjects were self-selected and signed up
under full informed consent. It was explained that
the goal of the experiment was to discover their Twit-
ter account using an undirected exploratory approach
and that it was difficult to predict the results and what
kind of form they would take. Of these subjects, 12
had a Twitter account and provided the name of that
account. Therefore, for this dataset the ground truth
is known, hence inclusion could be measured.
The second dataset, called ‘ISZW’, was provided
by the ISZW and consisted of 85 subjects that were
picked from a real risk-analysis project. It was
claimed by the ISZW that the subjects were a repre-
sentative sample of the group currently under inves-
tigation by the ISZW. These subjects did not sign up
voluntarily and were (and are) not informed that they
were part of an experiment. A contract was signed
that defined the authors as responsible for carrying
out a pilot for the ISZW and specified the conditions
they had to uphold. This made it both legal as well as
moral to make this data available to the authors.
Execution A number of runs were done with the
IMatcher to gather all data needed. Due to the depen-
dence on external services and data-intensive tasks,
the runs could take a lot of time (48 hours for the
longest). Therefore, great care was taken to select a
minimum number of runs to facilitate all goals. The
first four runs were done on the subjects of the sign-
up dataset. One run, including all information avail-
able about the subjects, had 15 iterations. The other
three runs, where some input attributes were left out,
were meant to run five times. Only the last iteration
of run 4 failed, due to an unfortunate reaching of a re-
quest limit. A fith run was performed on the subjects
from the ISZW dataset.
All runs were repeated with an altered version of
the IMatcher that had a broader search for building
the longlist (see ‘Queries’ below). Due to result sizes
and data volumes involved, each run consisted of only
one iteration. Again, there is a missing iteration for
the final run, run 9, with the sign-up dataset.
Table 1 describes all runs, the dataset they used,
the number of iterations, and which input attributes
Run data set n Input attributes A
1 sign-up 15 all
2 sign-up 5 all except lastname
3 sign-up 5 all except address
4 sign-up 5 all except e-mail & telephone
5 ISZW 3 all
6 sign-up 1 all
7 sign-up 1 all except lastname
8 sign-up 1 all except address
9 sign-up 1 all except e-mail & telephone
10 ISZW 1 all
Table 1: Runs performed with the IMatcher
were used.
The reasons for choosing these 10 runs are as fol-
lows. The results of the first four runs were used for
the first three goals. Comparing the average setsize
and inclusion of the different runs, the influence of in-
put attributes can be established. Also, each run pro-
vides data related to the relation between the number
of iterations and setsize and inclusion. These mea-
surements are meant to be interpreted in relation to
each other, to see the value of each input attribute.
Run 1, which had the most input available and was
thus expected to perform best, was continued longer
than the other runs to establish a better absolute pro-
jection of the results. Runs 6 to 10 were run for the
fourth goal to discover the influence of search queries
on inclusion.
To make the results of certain iterations as compa-
rable as possible, they should run against an Internet
in more-or-less the same state. Therefore, all itera-
tions i of a run were started as close to each other
in time as possible. As a consequence, there was
a gap of about 16–25 hours between iterations of a
run, depending on the moment of completion of other
runs. After each iteration a snapshot was made of the
database, so metrics could be calculated afterwards.
Queries For all input attributes except address, key-
word sets were constructed: each attribute individu-
ally as well as all combinations of firstname(s) and
lastname(s). With each such keyword set, Google
search queries were constructed in two ways.
• direct: the query is equal to the keyword set.
• guided: two queries are constructed as “Twitter
keyword set” and “keyword set site:twitter.com”.
Twitter accounts were extracted from a top-k of
Google results: either directly if a result refers to
a Twitter profile, or from the page the result refers
to by means of the regular expressions @[a-zA-Z ]*
and (http(s)?://)?(www.)?twitter.com/[a-zA-Z ]. For
address, a geographical search was performed with
a radius of r meters using the now retired Twitter API
V17.
For runs 1–5, IMatcher was configured with
search criteria direct, k = 8, and r = 200. For runs
6–10, search criteria were guided, k = 20, r = 200.
5.2 RESULTS
Experimental results for average setsize Ln and inclu-
sion In are shown in Figures 3 and 4, respectively.
Each subfigure shows a pair of runs that use the same
input parameters.
It can be seen that specific input attributes do in-
fluence the results. Leaving out lastname shrinks the
average setsize by roughly 50%, but also reduces in-
clusion 7→ 2 and 11→ 3, respectively. Leaving out
address reduces the average setsize by roughly 33%,
but has no influence on inclusion. Leaving out phone
numbers and e-mail adresses does not seem to influ-
ence average setsize nor inclusion.
The convergence expectations are not confirmed
by our experiments. The average setsize did not sta-
bilize and inclusion did not increase with more itera-
tions.
Pinpointing t˜p amongCnp Close to 37k rows of raw
feature data was extracted from the gathered data. It
consists of the person, the twitter candidate, a number
of similarity scores, the run, and the iteration number.
An attempt was made to predict whether the person
has a Twitter account, as well as whether a candidate
is the correct one. This relates to step 3 of our ap-
proach. Unfortunately, this attempt proved too inef-
fective for it to be useful to present here.
Note that this analysis could only be performed
for the sign-up subject group, since no ground truth
was known for the ISZW dataset.
6 DISCUSSION
From the experimental results, we can conclude
a number of things. First of all, the convergence ex-
pectations were not confirmed. Therefore, the amount
of data to be managed is larger and will grow longer
than the lengths of the runs we experimented with (15
being the longest). than expected. However, we still
expect that, after even more iterations, the pruner will
prune enough accounts to keep the candidate set size
constant or even decrease it over time.
Secondly, the approach is sensitive to certain in-
put attributes. The full name needs to be available,
7https://blog.twitter.com/2013/api-v1-retirement-final-dates
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Figure 3: Average setsize Ln after n iterations. Runs 6–10 are depicted in the graphs as the last iteration (n= 16, 6, 6, 6, and
4, respectively). Last iteration of run 4 and 9 failed.
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ground truth known for the ISZW dataset, there is no graph for runs 5&10. Again, Runs 6–9 are depicted in the graphs as the
last iteration (n= 16, 6, 6, and 6, respectively). Last iteration of run 4 and 9 failed.
since leaving it out will decrease inclusion dramati-
cally. E-mail addresses and phone numbers do not
seem to influence effectiveness.
Thirdly, there is no rise in inclusion after the first
iteration. This is unexpected and most likely due to
the small scale of our experiments and the open nature
of our volunteers. Fraudulent people are expected to
be less open, hence their account is not expected to be
found with a first search. We still believe that increas-
ing the number of subjects and the number of itera-
tions will show that inclusion will slowly converge to
the number of subjects with a Twitter account.
Finally, broadening the search queries Q did have
an impact on both setsize and inclusion. Research is
needed to investigate this relation in more detail. In
practice, an iterative deepening approach might prove
powerful in addressing the fact that candidates ac-
counts can be ranked at any position in query results.
Increasing the top-k of query results that is explored
with each iteration if no definite candidate is found
yet, might prove a good strategy.
Future work As stated above, we were not able to
perform step 3 of our approach satisfactorily. We sus-
pect that the problem lies in the chosen features we
extracted from the accounts and our similarity func-
tions. As we have shown the viability of a search,
monitor and match approach on internet-scale, we
aim to improve the second and third step in future
work. We intend to focus on retrieving more char-
acteristics of the online presences we find and com-
paring them to known characteristics. We expect that
including more characteristics like usernames, pho-
tographs, language usage and locations mentioned in
text will improve our matching algorithms and thus
allow us to pinpoint the one correct account or at least
a group of 2 or 3 most likely candidates.
We are also interested in extending our research
beyond Twitter to other online presences, like Face-
book, E-Bay and even homepages in general. Gather-
ing more online presences will allow for better char-
acteristic extraction and thus for better fraud pre-
diction. It will also enable the exploitation of self-
mentioning.
7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
When undertaking research such as ours, it is im-
portant to consider its morality. We co-operated with
an ethicist to see if our work is ethically justifiable.
We were confident that our experiment was, since
we followed university guidelines for subject selec-
tion and experiment design. However, the context ne-
cessitates considering its (possible) uses to assess the
desirability of pursuing the research.
Aime van Wynsberghe (Wynsberghe et al., 2013)
used our work to develop a set of generic guidelines
for working with data from social network sites. To-
gether we published a paper describing the guidelines
and applying them to our research.
Using these guidelines and elements from value
sensitive design (Friedman et al., 2006), we con-
cluded that our research was ethically justifiable as
a value trade-off taking into account the interests of
people investigated, people who’s account is included
in a candidate set as false positive, the ISZW and all
Dutch citizens. One important factor was also that,
although requesting welfare support is not really by
choice, the receiver is not obliged to do so. By re-
questing welfare support, someone voluntarily gives
up some privacy to allow the government to investi-
gate if he rightfully does so. This aspect also shows
that using our design to investigate other groups has
to be considered for its own merits. For more details,
we refer to (Been, 2013).
8 CONCLUSIONS
Fraud risk analysis on data from formal infor-
mation sources, being a paper reality, suffers from
blindness to false information. Moreover, the very
act of providing false information is a strong indica-
tor for fraud. As a step towards the vision of har-
nessing real-world data from social media and inter-
net for fraud risk analysis, we present a novel iter-
ative search, monitor, and match approach for find-
ing on-line presences of people. The approach needs
only limited name/address input data available to gov-
ernmental organizations responsible for fraud detec-
tion. A real-world experiment showed that Twitter
accounts can be effectively found: from a voluntary
sign-up subject group of 22 subjects, the correct ac-
count was almost always captured. Our initial attempt
at pinpointing the correct account for each subject
proved ineffective, but we expect this to be a matter of
choosing other features and classification techniques,
since the correct account is included and rich data is
gathered. We also experimented with a larger subject
group of 85 subjects from the ISZW. Finally, an anal-
ysis is given of the ethics surrounding the application
of such technology for fraud risk analysis. We aim to
extend IMatcher to search for more kinds of on-line
presences such as other social networks, extract and
monitor more characteristics, and improve the person
vs. on-line presence matching.
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